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This paper is the first to investigate the importance of geography in explaining equity market 
participation. We provide evidence to support two distinct local area effects. The first is a 
community ownership effect, that is, individuals are influenced by the investment behavior of 
members of their community. Specifically, a ten percentage-point increase in equity market 
participation of the members of one’s community makes it two percentage points more likely 
that the individual will invest in stocks. We find further evidence that the influence of 
community members is strongest for less financially sophisticated households and strongest 
within “peer groups” as defined by age and income categories. The second is that proximity to 
publicly-traded firms also increases equity market participation. In particular, the presence of 
publicly-traded firms within 50 miles and the share of U.S. market value headquartered within 
the community are significantly correlated with equity ownership of individuals. These results 
are quite robust, holding up in the presence of a wide range of individual and community 
controls, instrumental variables estimation, the inclusion of individual fixed effects, and 
specification checks to rule out that the relations are driven solely by ownership of the stock of 
one’s employer. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
  What influences a household’s decision to participate in the stock market?  Only one-half 
of U.S. households invest in the stock market, and an even smaller fraction, fewer than 30 
percent, hold stocks or mutual funds outside of retirement plans.
1  There are many reasons why 
the determinants of stock market participation are of interest to researchers and policy makers.  
The most obvious is that portfolio allocation can be an important determinant of wealth and well-
being.  As a result of the significant equity premium over the past century [Mehra and Prescott 
1985, Fama and French 2002], individuals who participated in the stock market, on average, 
increased their risk but were able to accumulate significantly more wealth than individuals who 
did not, holding fixed their level of active saving. As a result, participation in equity markets can 
have a substantial effect on lifetime consumption patterns. Second, as discussed by Mankiw and 
Zeldes [1991], Heaton and Lucas [2000], and Brav, Constantinides, and Gezcy [2002], the rate 
of equity market participation can, in turn, affect the level of the equity premium itself. 
  The rate of stock market participation is also important for public policy.  For example, 
the fact that a large share of households has no equity market exposure played a role in the recent 
debate over the distributional effects of lowering the tax rate on capital gains and dividends 
[Friedman and Greenstein 2003].  Also, proponents of including personal accounts in the Social 
Security system often suggest that a benefit of doing so is to expand equity ownership to all 
households.  Moreover, the presence of equity market non-participants means that investing 
Social Security surpluses in private investments can have real effects on the economy [Abel 
2001, Diamond and Geanakoplos 2003]. 
                                                 
1 These figures are based on authors’ tabulations from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, and are consistent 
with other published estimates using these sources, such as Bertaut & Starr-McCluer (2000). Moreover, Aizcorbe, 
Kennickell, and Moore (2003) report similar findings.   2
 
In very simple models of portfolio choice, it is easy to show that even extremely risk 
averse investors should place at least a small portion of their assets in stocks [e.g., Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green 1995].  However, there are many cases in which non-participation may be 
rational.  First, given the presence of means-tested social insurance programs, many households 
may find it optimal not to save at all [Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1995, Scholz, Seshardi, and 
Khitatrakun 2003].  Second, even among those who save, there may be fixed costs of investing 
in equity markets that make it rational for many individuals not to participate.  For example, 
Vissing-Jorgensen [1999] finds that a fixed cost of equity market participation as low as $200 
would be sufficient to lead to currently observed rates of non-participation.  Some of these fixed 
costs may be psychological, that is, the need to educate oneself about how markets work, how to 
invest, and so forth.  Studies have documented that equity market participation rates do vary with 
demographic characteristics.  For example, it is known that stock market participation increases 
with income, age and wealth, and that men are more likely to participate than women [Poterba 
and Samwick 1999]. 
This paper presents what we believe is the first evidence on the importance of two 
geographic effects on equity market participation.  The first factor, the “community effect,” is 
that an individual is more likely to participate in the stock market when a higher fraction of 
individuals in the local community (households residing within 50 miles) are stock market 
investors.  Based on a large, nationally representative panel data set of 88,000 taxpayers over a 
period of 10 years (for a total of over 750,000 taxpayer-year observations), we provide a central 
estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in stock ownership in the community increases the 
probability that an individual participates in the equity market by 2 percentage points, or an 
increase of more than 6 percent relative to baseline ownership rates.  We also provide evidence   3
 
that this effect is strongest for less financially sophisticated households, and that households are 
more affected by the participation decision of individuals who are “more similar” (in terms of 
age and income) to themselves.    
The second factor, the “local firm effect,” is that an individual’s propensity to buy stocks 
is positively influenced by the presence of local, publicly-traded firms in the community.  For 
example, the mere presence of at least one publicly-traded firm in the community (that is, at least 
one firm is headquartered within 50 miles) increases the likelihood of participation by one 
percentage point.  From there, a five-percentage point increase in the share of total U.S. market 
capitalization headquartered in the community (i.e., roughly a one standard deviation change) 
increases the likelihood of participation by an additional percentage point. 
Recognizing that the location of a household is not randomly assigned, we subject these 
findings to a wide range of robustness checks and find that the effects are quite persistent.  We 
find evidence of community ownership effects and local firm effects even after including an 
extremely rich set of individual and zip code level covariates, implementing an instrumental 
variables strategy, and even controlling for individual fixed effects. 
There are many reasons to suspect that the equity market participation rate of one’s 
community may influence one’s own decision.  First, Hong, Kubik, and Stein [2004] present a 
model in which stock market participation may be influenced by social interaction.  Such social 
interaction can serve as a mechanism for information exchange via “word-of-mouth” and/or 
“observational learning” [Banerjee 1992, Ellison and Fudenberg 1993, 1995].  Put simply, many 
individuals may find it easier to learn how to open up a mutual fund or brokerage account by 
talking to their friends than through other mechanisms.  Second, as also noted by Hong, Kubik, 
and Stein [2004], individuals may simply enjoy discussing the ups and downs of stock market   4
 
investments with their friends and colleagues and are thus more apt to participate in the stock 
market if there is a high participation rate among their friends and colleagues.  Third, according 
to Bernheim’s [1994] model of conformity individuals may wish to maintain the same 
consumption of their social group does.  Thus, participation in the stock market by their social 
group would have a positive influence on their own decision to do so.  This effect could also be 
generated by external habit formation models [Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Shore and White 
2003] or the scarcity of local resources that lead investors to care about their relative wealth in 
the community [DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer 2002].   
There is a significant body of research documenting the empirical relevance of 
“neighborhood effects,” or “peer effects,” in wide variety of settings, ranging from outcomes for 
disadvantaged youth [Case and Katz 1991] to crime [Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 1996].  
In the specific context of financial behavior, Duflo and Saez [2002, 2003] show how the decision 
by one’s co-workers to participate in tax-deferred savings plans affects one’s own participation 
decision.  Hong, Kubik, and Stein [2004] show that more “social” individuals, namely those who 
interact frequently with neighbors or attend church, are more likely to participate in equity 
markets.  While Hong, Kubik, and Stein show that the effect of “sociability” on the participation 
decision is stronger in states with high rates of participation, our paper, to our knowledge, is the 
first to provide direct empirical evidence on the importance of the equity market participation 
rate of one’s community on an individual’s own participation decision.  Furthermore, our panel 
data gives us an advantage in that we can use household fixed effects to control for unobservable 
household characteristics that may spuriously drive such a relation in a cross-sectional setting.   
The second effect we report in this paper, namely that a stronger presence of publicly-
traded firms in one’s community increases the probability of equity market participation, is   5
 
motivated by a growing literature on the importance of local firm effects in other financial 
contexts.  Several papers provide evidence that individual investors prefer “familiar,” or local, 
investments.  For example, we know that, around the world, investors have a “home equity bias” 
[French and Poterba 1991].  Participants in 401(k) plans show a strong tendency to overweight 
own-company stock in their portfolios [Benartzi 2001, Liang and Weisbenner 2002, Mitchell and 
Utkus 2002].  Huberman [2001], Grinblatt and Keloharju [2000], Zhu [2002], and Ivković & 
Weisbenner [2003] document individual investor preferences for local stocks.  While some of 
this local preference may simply reflect a behavioral bias for “familiarity,” mounting evidence 
supports the idea that some of this behavior is information-based.  For example, Coval and 
Moskowitz [1999, 2001] demonstrate that professional money managers lean toward local stocks 
and that their local investments outperform their investments made in more distant firms.  At the 
individual level, Ivković and Weisbenner [2003] show that individuals investors at a retail 
discount brokerage firm have a strong preference for local investment and that households 
generate an additional return of 3.2% annually from their local versus non-local investments.     
This paper provides the first evidence that the presence of local firms also has a 
quantitatively important influence on the probability of participating in the stock market.  There 
are two classes of reasons why local firm presence may matter.  The first is simple familiarity.  
Firms “make their presence known” in their home community in many ways, either directly (e.g., 
sponsoring community events) or indirectly (e.g., firm’s presence is learned via social interaction 
with employees of the firm).  Second, the presence of local firms is likely to lead to an increased 
flow of information, such as stories in the local paper or television news about details of a 
company’s business, as well as more attention paid to the stock market in general.  In either case, 
familiarity or knowledge about a particular company may make it more likely that an individual   6
 
will choose to get involved in the stock market, particularly given the possibility that this local 
knowledge may give an investor the ability to earn returns superior to those they would likely 
earn from investing in non-local companies [Ivković and Weisbenner 2003]. 
  This paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we introduce the data set.  Section 3 
provides initial results on the “traditional” determinants of equity market participation such as 
demographic and financial characteristics.  In Section 4, we present our results showing the 
effect of community stock market participation and local firm presence.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
II.  The Data 
A. The Panel of U.S. Taxpayers 
  To conduct a nationally representative study of how individual equity market 
participation decisions are influenced by geographic factors such as community equity market 
participation and firm presence, it is necessary to have a very large, nationally representative 
dataset containing many observations for each “community.”  To the extent that the “community 
effect” is based on an individual’s interactions with friends, neighbors and co-workers, it is 
important to choose a geographic size that is large enough to capture most of the individuals in a 
person’s social group, but not so large as to completely dilute these effects.   Most standard 
micro data sets are not well suited for this task.  For example, the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), arguably the best available, nationally representative study for examining household 
financial decision making, is a cross-sectional study with only approximately 5,000 observations.  
The Health and Retirement Study, which offers the potential advantage of being a panel study, is   7
 
only slightly larger than the SCF and focuses only on particular cohorts nearing or in retirement.
2  
Similar problems are associated with most other standard household data sets.   
Our primary source of data is a large panel of tax returns covering the years 1987 to 
1996.
3  The panel is based on the IRS’s annual cross-sectional sample of tax returns, which are 
large samples chosen to represent the population of tax-return filers.  The population of tax filers 
is similar to the population of households, except that a household may comprise more than one 
tax-filing unit (e.g., dependents may file their own returns), and some households do not file any 
tax returns.
4  For example, our data for 1994 represent about 130 million tax returns, while the 
1995 SCF (covering the year 1994) represents about 100 million households.  Throughout the 
paper we use the terms individuals, households, and taxpayers interchangeably, but strictly 
speaking, the unit of observation for this data set is the taxpayer. 
The annual IRS cross-sections are stratified samples, with the probability of inclusion 
rising steeply with total income.
5  Variables include most of the values from the 1040 tax form 
and associated schedules, as well as data matched from Social Security records, such as the age 
and gender of each individual represented on the return.
6  The 1987 cross-section sample of 
about 88,000 returns is the base year of the panel.  The panel was constructed by matching, in 
each subsequent year, the full population of tax returns for the Social Security numbers of all 
taxpayers, spouses, and dependents that appeared in the 1987 sample.  This method allows 
                                                 
2 The original HRS survey, fielded in 1992, consisted of approximately 7,500 households with at least one member 
born between 1931 and 1941.  In later waves of the survey, additional cohorts have been added, but in no case does 
it contain households below 50 years of age.   
3 The panel was developed as a joint effort between the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Analysis and the IRS’s 
Statistics of Income division. The panel uses confidential records and is not publicly available. 
4 Low-income households are not required to file returns (but many do so in order to claim a refund of over-
withholding or a refundable tax credit such as the EITC).  In 1987, the filing threshold ranged from $4,400 to 
$10,000, depending on age and filing status. 
5 We use sampling weights, defined as the inverse probability of selection, when reporting all tabulations and 
descriptive statistics.   
6 Further details on the construction of the tax data are available in Amromin & Smith (2003).   8
 
individuals to be tracked over time regardless of income changes, marriage, divorce, or 
establishment of a new tax unit by a former dependent.
7 
To simplify the analysis, we exclude married couples filing separate returns and restrict 
the analysis to taxpayers who were primary filers in 1987.  This reduces the sample to 767,295 
tax returns over the ten-year period.  Another important advantage of the tax data is that it 
contains very precise geographical identifiers (i.e., zip codes) that can be used to create our 
geographic measures of interest.  We are able to match the zip code reported on the tax return 
with a location (i.e., latitude and longitude) for 753,103 observations. 
While tax data has many advantages, its traditional disadvantage for many purposes is 
that it contains less information about non-financial demographic characteristics, such as race, 
ethnicity, occupation and industry.  To address this concern, we merge a wide range of Census 
data by zip code.  As a result, while we do not know, for example, the race of a particular 
taxpayer, we do know the racial composition of the zip code in which the taxpayer resides.  The 
same is true of other pertinent characteristics.      
B. Measuring Equity Ownership 
Naturally, to conduct a study on the determinants of equity market participation, it is 
necessary to have a good measure of whether an individual owns stock.  Because it is not 
necessary for the IRS to know stock ownership for tax purposes, the tax return does not provide 
direct information about stock ownership.  Nevertheless, we are able to proxy for equity 
                                                 
7 As a result of this sampling methodology, our sample is not subject to sample attrition bias that sometimes afflicts 
panel studies using survey data.  There is, however, attrition from the population of tax filers that occurs when a 
filer’s income drops below the filing threshold. This source of attrition is non-random – older and lower-income 
workers are more likely to drop out of the filing population than middle-aged, higher-income workers.  Using data 
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, we have found that the fraction of non-filers who own equities in a non-
retirement account is only 2-4% over the period 1989-1998.      9
 
ownership using the appearance of dividend income and/or capital gains on the tax return.  Given 
our reliance on tax return data to infer stock market participation, we will miss people who only 
invest in stocks or equity mutual funds in non-taxable (i.e., retirement) accounts.  Thus, when we 
refer to equity market participation throughout the paper, we are specifically referring to stock or 
equity mutual fund ownership in one’s taxable account (i.e., outside of retirement plans).    
The dividends measure will capture all dividends paid out on stock and dividends paid 
through taxable mutual funds.  There are two reasons why this proxy is imperfect.  First, 
dividend income as reported on a tax return includes payouts from any mutual fund, even if the 
fund is exclusively invested, for example, in fixed-income assets.  Second, while dividends will 
capture equity ownership for those who invest in dividend-paying firms, it may miss those who 
invest primarily in non-dividend paying firms, such as those in the technology sector that became 
increasingly important during the 1990s.  A second measure is realized capital gains.  This would 
capture stockholders who sell shares of a stock or a mutual fund, whether at a gain or a loss.  Of 
course, capital gains will also capture the gains from the sale of other, non-stock assets, such as 
investment real estate or collectibles.  The third potential measure of stock ownership is to 
combine the first two, defining someone as a stockowner if they report dividends and/or capital 
gains.       
Because of the potential for both type 1 and type 2 errors in defining equity ownership, a 
natural first question to ask is whether our measures really are reasonable proxies for actual 
equity ownership.  The Survey of Consumer Finances allows us to address this concern, and the 
results clearly indicate that they are good proxies.  Table 1 reports the correlation between actual 
equity ownership (i.e., equity ownership outside of retirement plans) as reported by SCF 
respondents and whether these same households reported dividends and capital gains on their tax   10
 
return in the previous year.  The correlations are quite high, averaging 0.62 for dividends, 0.47 
for capital gains, and 0.63 for the combined measure.  While there is a slight downward trend in 
the correlations over time (more for dividends than the combined measure), the overall decline is 
not large and can be easily controlled for in a regression framework by using year fixed effects.   
Table 2 reports the trends of equity ownership in our tax panel as measured by our 
reported dividend and capital gains proxies, as well the actual equity ownership rates reported in 
the SCF over this period.  We report the SCF equity ownership rates among tax-filers to facilitate 
direct comparison across these two sources of data.  From 1987 to 1996, the fraction of the 
population reporting dividends and/or capital gains rose from just over one-quarter to just over 
one-third of the taxpaying population.  We see similar trends among dividends and capital gains 
separately.  This is consistent with the trend in actual equity ownership, as reported in the SCF 
over a similar period (from 1989 to 1998, actual equity ownership rates rose from 22.2 percent to 
30.5 percent).  Figure 1 illustrates the growth rates in actual equity ownership as well as the 
equity ownership proxy (report dividend and/or capital gains on the tax return).  Over the 
overlapping period (1989–1996), our proxy for equity ownership increased by 22%, comparable 
to the 20% increase in actual equity ownership.  
C. Defining “Community” 
  We define the geographic span of a community as a circle around a household with a 50-
mile radius.  We choose this distance for several reasons.  First, we believe that 50 miles will 
capture the vast majority of one’s social interactions, including those that are employment based.  
According to the 1990 Census, 88% of the population lives within 25 miles of work (98% live 
within 50 miles).  Of course, if two co-workers each live only 25 miles from work, the may live 
as many as 50 miles from one another.  In considering firm locality effects, it is especially   11
 
important not to choose an area that is too small.  In essence, it is important that any firms that 
are likely to be prominent in the local news market and other forms of interaction with the 
community be included in a measure of firm locality, and 50 miles is a reasonable cut-off to 
capture this effect.
8   
  Table 3 reports summary statistics for our key variables of interest, including equity 
market participation rates and measures of local firms.  As in Table 2, the mean value of equity 
ownership (defined here using the combined dividend and/or capital gains measure) is 
approximately 30 percent.  The second row of Table 3 shows the distribution of equity 
ownership by the 50-mile radius communities for each of our households.  Note that for each 
individual i the 50 mile radius variable is constructed by determining what fraction of households 
within a 50 mile radius of individual i, but excluding individual i, own stock.  At the 10
th 
percentile of the distribution, about 1 in 5 community households own stock, whereas this ratio 
rises to nearly 2 in 5 community households at the 90
th percentile.   
  Nearly 92 percent of households have at least one publicly-traded firm headquartered 
within 50 miles.
9  However, the share of total U.S. firm market value residing (i.e., 
headquartered) in that 50-mile radius differs substantially.  To help place this in context, over the 
period from 1987 to 1996, 0.7% of U.S. firm market value was located within 50 miles of 
Kansas City, MO on average (this is roughly the median value across communities), 5.6% was 
located within 50 miles of Dallas, TX, 8.3% was located within 50 miles of Chicago, and 25.8% 
was located within 50 miles of New York City.  At the 10
th percentile of the distribution, less 
than 1/1000
th of one percent of firm value is located within 50 miles. At the 90
th percentile, 7.7 
                                                 
8 We ran most of our base specifications using a 25-mile radius definition, and found similar, significant results. 
9 Compustat provides the location of a firm’s headquarters, allowing us to compute the distance between each 
individual taxpayer and each firm.  Thus, all references to the location of a firm refer to the firm’s headquarters, and 
not the location of its individual factories or plants.   12
 
percent of total market value is located within 50 miles.  The final row of Table 3 reports the 
distribution of population, which, not surprisingly, is significantly less concentrated than the 
population of firms.   
 
III. Demographic and Financial Determinants of Stock Market Participation 
  Before testing our hypotheses of interest, it is useful first to examine how equity market 
participation varies with standard demographic and financial measures.  Not only are these 
measures of potential interest in their own right, but they also serve as a rich source of controls in 
the specifications in which we test for geographic effects of participation and local firms.   
  Table 4 reports the coefficients from a simple linear probability model of individual i’s 
stock market participation on characteristics of the individual taken from the tax return and on 
characteristics of the household’s zip code for variables unavailable on the individual-level 
because they are not reported on the tax return (e.g., race).
10  We use rich controls for age and 
income, including dummy variables for various age and income categories, as well as entering 
income, income squared, age, and age squared.  As expected, equity ownership is strongly 
increasing with income and age.  It is also increasing with wealth proxies. For example, 
households who claim a mortgage interest deduction (a proxy for home ownership), receive 
income from rental real estate, royalties, partnerships or S-corporations (file a schedule E), or 
own a defined contribution plan through work are all more likely to own equity in their non-
retirement account.  We also find that equity ownership is higher for the self-employed (file a 
schedule C) and those who are subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax.  Equity market 
                                                 
10 Throughout this paper, we report results using a simple linear probability model, so the coefficient estimates can 
be directly interpreted as marginal effects.  An examination of the marginal effects from a non-linear probit model 
yields very similar results.   13
 
participation is lower for single households and for those who file as a head of household 
(generally signifying a single parent family).  Families with more dependents are also less likely 
to own equity, although the effect is not economically large (e.g., four additional children lowers 
the probability of stock ownership by only one percentage point). 
  We use averages across a zip code when individual-level data is not available, and these 
zip-code-level characteristics are also quite significant.  Households in more highly educated zip 
codes are more likely to own stock.  Households in zip codes with a higher concentration of 
African-American, Hispanic, or Asian households are also less likely to own stock.  The mean 
house price in the zip code is insignificant.  We also find lower levels of ownership for 
households in zip codes with a higher proportion of clerical workers, craftsmen, operators, and 
similar fields, relative to professionals.  Finally, we find that a larger concentration of private 
sector employees is correlated with higher equity ownership, whereas households in zip codes 
with many local, state, and federal government employees are less likely to own stock.     
 
IV.  Testing for Geographic Effects 
  We seek to test two primary hypotheses.  The first is that an individual’s equity market 
participation decision is influenced by the equity market participation of other individuals in the 
community.  The second hypothesis is that this decision is affected by the proximity of publicly 
traded firms.  We test for both of these effects in a regression specification that conditions on all 
of the variables discussed in Section 3.  We are looking for community effects and local firm 
effects after conditioning not only on a rich set of individual demographic and financial 
characteristics, but also on zip-code-level controls for race, ethnicity, occupation, employment 
sector, and housing prices.     14
 
A. Initial Results for Community Ownership Effects 
  Table 5 presents the first set of results for community effects.  Columns (1) through (3) 
present results for regressions in which we define equity ownership as one if an individual 
reports dividends and/or capital gains.  Columns (4) through (6) report results defining equity 
ownership solely based on dividends, while columns (7) through (9) use the capital gains 
measure.  For each of these three alternative proxies for equity ownership, we first report, in 
columns (1), (4), and (7), our basic specification that includes all the variables from Table 4, year 
dummies, controls for the population of the community, and the six variables of interest whose 
coefficients are reported in this table.  Because our sample consists of pooled observations across 
all years in the panel, in all regressions we adjust the standard errors for clustering on the 
taxpayer ID to account for correlation of the same taxpayer’s equity ownership over time.   
The coefficient on equity ownership in the rest of the community is highly statistically 
significant.
11  It is also economically significant, suggesting that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the fraction of one’s community that owns equity (e.g., moving from the 10
th percentile to the 
median or the median to the 90
th percentile) increases one’s own probability of owning equity by 
1.6 to 2.4 percentage points, depending on which equity proxy is used.  From a base of 30 
percent equity market participation, this is roughly a 6 percent increase over the baseline.   
  Despite the fact that we already have more than 50 additional control variables on the 
right-hand side of our regression to control for income, wealth and demographic effects, one 
might still argue that the community effect coefficient simply reflects the fact that people prefer 
to live near people who are like them.  Even after controlling for own characteristics, it might be 
                                                 
11 In all cases, the definition of community equity ownership is based on the same definition as individual 
ownership.  Equity ownership in individual i’s community is computed exclusive of individual i’s own equity 
ownership.   15
 
the case that higher income people like to live near other high-income people, and both like to 
own stock.  To test for sensitivity to this critique, in columns (2), (5), and (8) we add as 
additional covariates a richer set of controls for the individual’s zip code, including average 
income, age, filing status, number of dependents, self-employment status, and so on, among 
households in individual i's zip code.  We find that the inclusion of these additional regressors 
has virtually no effect on our primary coefficient of interest.  Thus, even after controlling for own 
characteristics and the characteristics of other individuals in the zip code, we still find a 
significant and robust relation between equity market participation of individuals and other 
residents in their community.
12 
Columns (3), (6), and (9) take even further these concerns about the simultaneous 
determination of the equity market participation of an individual and his or her community.  
Here, we employ an instrumental variables strategy whereby we instrument for the equity market 
participation rates of individuals in the 50-mile radius using the average income, age and other 
financial characteristics of households in the 50-mile radius.  The logic of these instruments is 
that, conditional on own financial and demographic characteristics, and conditional on 
characteristics of the household’s zip code, there is little reason to expect that the age or income 
distribution of households in the larger community should directly influence stock market 
participation rates of a particular household.  In other words, our identification assumption is that 
these broad community characteristics, while highly correlated with ownership rates of the 
                                                 
12 In Appendix Table 1, we report the coefficients on all of our individual-level and zip-code-level control variables 
from the regression in column (2) in Table 5.  Note that, while the average income across the household’s zip code is 
significant, the estimated effect is fairly small.  For example, while having household income between $50-150k 
increases the probability of ownership by 8.1 percentage points and having household income over $150k increases 
the probability 27.3 percentage points relative to a household with low income, the comparable zip-code level 
controls have an effect that is only 1/10
th as large.   16
 
community, will not be correlated with individual i’s equity market participation except through 
the stock market participation of these other individuals.
13   
  As the instrumental variable (I.V.) results in columns (3), (6) and (9) suggest, the I.V. 
approach makes virtually no difference in our coefficients of interest.  If anything, the I.V. 
strategy increases the coefficient slightly when using capital gains as our equity ownership 
proxy, but the effect on the other proxies is minimal.  Given that our I.V. results closely mirror 
our un-instrumented regression results, for the rest of this paper, we will use the middle 
specification (no instrumental variables, but including the full set of zip-code-level 
characteristics) as our base case.   
B. Initial Results for Local Firm Effects 
  Several local firm effects are also significant.  First, individuals who have at least one 
publicly-traded firm headquartered within 50 miles are approximately one percentage point more 
likely to own equities.  Furthermore, as the share of the total U.S. market capitalization within an 
individual’s community increases, the probability of owning equities increases further.  For 
example, a five percentage point increase in the share of firm value headquartered within 50 
miles, which corresponds roughly to a one standard deviation change, increases the probability 
of owning stocks by an additional percentage point.  To put this increase in perspective, a move 
from Kansas City, MO (a community with roughly the median share of U.S. firms) to Dallas, TX 
would increase the equity ownership of a household’s community by 5 percentage points (and 
                                                 
13 Recall that our concern is that people with similar tastes for stock market participation might sort and live in the 
same area.  Our regression already controls for demographic and financial characteristics of an individual’s zip code.  
Thus, our I.V. strategy relies on the assumption that the effect of any sorting of similar households into the same 
neighborhood is picked up by the zip-code-level controls (e.g., zip-code level age and income), and with the 
inclusion of these finer community controls, the broader community (i.e., 50-mile radius) characteristics will not be 
correlated with an individual’s equity ownership except through the stock market participation of other individual’s 
within the 50-mile radius.   17
 
thus would increase the likelihood that the household owns equity by 5*0.2 = one percentage 
point). Similarly, a move from Kansas City to Chicago would increase the equity ownership of a 
household’s community by 8 percentage points (and thus would increase the likelihood that the 
household owns equity by 1.6 percentage points), while a move from Kansas City to New York 
City would increase community equity ownership by 25 percentage points (and thus would 
increase the likelihood that the household owns equity by five percentage points).  Since the 
regressions also include controls for the population of the community, the local firm effect is not 
simply reflecting a big community effect. 
  The equally weighted average rate of return on local firms is not significant in most of the 
specifications.  The exception is with the dividend regressions, in which case it has a small 
negative effect.  Given that growth stocks (which are less likely to pay dividends) outperformed 
value stocks (which are more likely to pay dividends) seven of the ten years from 1987–1996, 
local investment opportunities of the communities whose firms had a higher stock return are 
more likely to be comprised of growth firms.  If individuals surrounded by growth stocks are 
more apt to own non-dividend paying growth stocks themselves, there will be a negative 
correlation between the return of local firms and dividend ownership of individuals in the 
community.
14 
The share of firm value in the community comprised of technology companies is 
negatively correlated with stock market participation.  There are at least two plausible 
explanations for this negative relation.  First, if stock market investors in such areas own 
primarily technology stocks, the regressions may simply be picking up the fact that these 
technology firms over the sample period are less likely to pay dividends.  In addition, because 
                                                 
14 Data on stock returns of growth and value stocks was obtained from Ken French’s web site 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html) plus authors’ calculations. 
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capital gains are recorded only upon sale, our proxies may accurately capture equity ownership 
in the technology sector only if the individual sells stock over the period.  Second, many of the 
individuals in this area may be employees of these technology companies, which suggests that 
part of their compensation package may come in the form of stock option grants.  If an individual 
has a large portion of their compensation tied up in stock options, they may rationally choose to 
keep the rest of their portfolio in safer (i.e., non-equity) investments.  Prior research [Heath, 
Huddart, and Lang 1999] suggests that most people, upon exercising their employee stock 
options, immediately sell the underlying stock, and, as a result, these proceeds would show up as 
ordinary income.  We will address the issue of company stock ownership more generally in later 
specification checks. 
C. Results over Time 
  Table 6 explores how the relations hold up over time.  The community ownership 
variable and the share of firms within 50 miles coefficients are reliably significant in all years, 
including years of economic downturns (early 1990s) as well as years of rapid economic growth.  
There does appear to be a decline in the importance of community effects beginning in 1995, 
with the coefficient falling by about one-third.  One possible explanation is that, to the extent that 
community effects arise from the exchange of information, the rise of the internet and/or the 
explosion in financial market news sources (e.g., CNBC) in the mid-1990s could have served as 
a substitute for word-of-mouth learning.        
D. Ruling Out an Alternative Hypothesis:  Is It Just Owning Company Stock? 
Thus far, we have presented very robust estimates of a strong relation between an 
individual’s equity participation propensity, the equity market participation rate of the   19
 
individual’s community, and the presence of local firms.  However, a potential criticism of these 
basic results is that they could be driven by the role of company stock.  Many companies 
encourage employees to purchase company stock, even subsidizing the offering through 
employee stock purchase plans.  It is possible that our findings are at least partially contaminated 
by the tendency that “local” firms encourage employees to buy company stock, and that this is 
confounding our estimates of both the community effects (e.g., individual i’s neighbors all work 
for the same company) and firm locality effects (the local firm is the firm at which individual i 
works). 
Our data allow us to test this alternative hypothesis directly in two ways.  The first test, 
presented in column (1) of Table 7, provides results for the sub-sample of the population that is 
self-employed,
15 a group that, by definition, will not be affected by the company-stock 
explanation.  Using the combined dividend/capital gains proxy for stock ownership, we find that 
the effect of equity ownership in the community is still both statistically and economically 
significant.  It suggests that a 10-percentage point increase in equity ownership in a community 
increases a self-employed individual’s probability of stock ownership by 1.1 percentage points.  
This effect is about two-thirds of what it was in Table 5, suggesting that, at most, the company 
stock explanation accounts for one-third of the correlation.  The local firm effects are also 
significant, and, in fact, are larger among the self-employed than the population as a whole.  
Assuming the self-employed are more financially sophisticated than the general population, then 
the local firm result could reflect that more financially savvy people are better able to collect 
value-relevant information about local firms, and thus are more apt to act upon this information 
                                                 
15 Our definition of self-employed is that they report schedule C income (positive or negative) and have income 
from an employer of less than $10,000.   20
 
(i.e., buy stock of any good local firm(s) they discover).  Indeed, the larger the share of firms 
local to the household, the more likely it is that there will be a local firm worth investing into. 
A second test of the company stock hypothesis is to limit the sample to the approximately 
10 percent of our sample that has no firms within 50 miles.  Again, we see that there is still a 
significant correlation between individual and community equity market participation.  
Naturally, the local firm effects are not identified for this sample.  These two sets of results 
together clearly suggest that our results are not attributable solely to a company stock 
phenomenon. 
E.  Differential Effects by Degree of Financial Sophistication 
  The first result we report in this study is that an individual’s decision whether to invest in 
the stock market is influenced by the participation decision of others in the household’s 
community (see Section 4.1).  It is reasonable to hypothesize that this effect might be weaker 
among more financially sophisticated individuals.  In short, we might expect that those familiar 
with basic principles of finance already understand the risks and rewards of equity market 
participation, and therefore make a decision to participate independently of what their peers do.  
Alternatively, those with very little exposure to finance may be much more influenced by what 
their co-workers and neighbors do.  The extent to which this is true probably depends on the 
underlying cause of the community effect.  For example, it is quite possible that conformity or 
external habit influences could be equally strong for financially savvy and less financially savvy 
households, whereas the provision of information about how to invest may be stronger among 
less financially savvy households.     
  Our second result is that equity market participation is influenced by the presence of local 
firms.  Whether this effect should vary by financial sophistication is ambiguous.  If the presence   21
 
of more local firms means that there is more information flowing about these firms, which in 
turn individual investors seem to have been able to use to generate returns superior to returns 
from investments into non-local firms [Ivković and Weisbenner, 2003], then one might expect 
that more financially sophisticated individuals would be more influenced by this factor.  In other 
words, as the number of local firms increases, there is a greater chance a financially savvy 
individual, able to collect value-relevant information about stocks, will find a local firm in which 
it is worth investing.
16  On the other hand, if the local firm effects do not provide profitable 
value-relevant information, but only serves to increase familiarity with the stock market, then 
one might expect the effect to be declining with financial sophistication. 
  Because we cannot directly observe financial sophistication, we proxy for it by 
examining how our effects differ across income groups, the implicit assumption being that higher 
income individuals, on average, are more financially sophisticated.  The top panel of Table 8 
shows that the effect of community ownership is indeed much stronger for lower income 
households.  While this effect is statistically significant for all income groups, the community 
ownership effect among those earning less than $150,000 per year is about three times stronger 
than the effect among those earning $150,000 or more.  The results also suggest that the local 
firm effect is strongest for high-income individuals, a finding consistent with the notion that a 
higher concentration of local firms provides information that can be utilized most effectively by 
higher income individuals.
17 
  Arguably a better proxy for financial sophistication might be education.  While our tax 
data does not allow us to observe the educational attainment of the taxpayer, we do know the 
                                                 
16 Ivković and Weisbenner (2003) report that roughly one in five households invest in only local stocks, suggesting 
that the presence of local firms may effect not only the household portfolio composition, but also whether the 
household owns equity. 
17 In results not presented here, we confirm that the finding that the local firm effect is strongest for high income 
individual holds true even when the high-income sample is restricted to the self-employed.   22
 
distribution of educational attainment in the household’s zip code.  The bottom panel of Table 8 
divides the sample into thirds by the share of households in the zip code that have a college 
education, where college education is defined as obtaining a bachelor or graduate degree.  We 
find a pattern similar to that of income, namely that the community ownership effect is 
somewhat stronger in less financially sophisticated areas, while the local firm effect is somewhat 
stronger in more financially sophisticated areas.  Relative to income, the effect is less 
pronounced, which is to be expected given that our education measure is a zip-code-level, rather 
than an individual-level variable. 
 
F. Household Fixed Effects 
Up to this point, the results have rested upon the critical assumption that individual and 
zip-code-level controls are sufficient to control for different individual propensities to invest in 
stocks.  However, an individual’s location is not randomly assigned.  As such, if individuals 
differ according to some unobservable characteristic Z (e.g., risk aversion, financial 
sophistication, etc.) and if individuals with similar values of Z tend to live together, then our 
community ownership effect may simply be picking up the effect of this omitted Z variable.   
Given the rich panel structure of our data, we are able to control for household fixed 
effects in our regressions.  The inclusion of fixed effects means that we are identifying our 
relations of interest solely off of differences over time.  As such, any fixed differences across 
individuals, be they observable (e.g., race or gender) or unobservable (e.g., risk aversion), will be 
differenced out of the results.   
In addition to differencing out individual fixed effects, we continue to control for all the 
variables from Table 4 that vary over time.  Thus, for our community effect, we are identifying   23
 
solely off of differences in own equity market participation, and differences in community equity 
market participation, that are orthogonal to differences in all other controls.  Where does any 
such variation come from?  The most significant source of variation will come from individuals 
who change residences during the sample period; other variation comes from changes within a 
given community over time.  Thus, one interpretation of these results is what happens to an 
individual’s equity market participation if the individual moves to an area with a different 
community participation rate.   
Results are shown in Table 9.  In the full sample (panel A), the effect of community 
equity ownership is statistically significant and is largely unaffected by the inclusion of firm 
controls, demographic controls, and zip code controls.  Interestingly, when the fixed-effects 
regressions are ran separately by income group, we find that the effect is concentrated among the 
individuals earning between $50,000 and $150,000 over the entire sample period.  Indeed, within 
this income group, the magnitude of the community ownership effect is comparable to what we 
initially found in Table 5, that is, a 10 percentage point difference in community equity 
ownership leads to a 2 percentage point difference in the probability of owning stocks.  It is not 
surprising that there is no relation between community equity ownership and an individual’s own 
stock ownership in the high-income sub-sample, given our earlier cross-sectional results.  One 
reason that the community effect is stronger in the middle-income group relative to the low-
income group in the fixed-effects framework is that there is more variation in the covariates of 
interest within this group.  For example, comparing points in the distribution of differences in the 
maximum and minimum equity ownership in an individual’s community over the sample period,   24
 
we find larger differences for the middle income group, suggesting more of the middle income 
individuals are moving, allowing the community effect to be more easily identified.
18 
Given earlier results in the pooled cross-sections, it is not surprising that changes in the 
share of firms local to a high-income individual is associated with an increase in the high-income 
individual’s propensity to own stock.  The estimated effect from the fixed-effect regression 
suggests a five percentage point increase in the share of U. S. firms local to the individual boosts 
the likelihood of stock ownership by a high-income individual by 1.2 percentage points, a figure 
comparable to results obtained in the cross-sectional analysis.   
In Panel B of table 9, we re-run our fixed effects specification focusing on a sample that 
consists entirely of movers.  Specifically, we define a taxpayer as a mover if they spend at least 
two years in the same zip code, then move to another zip code that is at least 100 miles away, 
and remain there for at least two years after the year of the move.  The 100-mile distance was 
chosen so that there is no overlap between the old and new community definitions.
19  In the three 
columns, we report results for the full sample, still using fixed effects.  The magnitude of the 
coefficients are nearly identical to the full sample results, although the standard errors go up 
substantially because our mover sample is only 4% of the total population.  In the remaining 
columns, we repeat our break-down of the sample by income group, and find patterns quite 
similar to the full sample fixed effects results, namely, that the effect is concentrated among 
those households in the middle income group.  Thus, when a middle income individual moves 
from one community to another, a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of the community 
                                                 
18 For example, the difference in the maximum and minimum equity ownership of an individual’s community over 
the sample is less than five percentage points for one quarter of the individuals in the low-income group. By 
contrast, only one tenth of the individuals in the middle-income group has such a small difference in their 
community’s equity ownership over the sample. 
19 Based on this definition, we have a sample of 4382 movers.  Because we observe these individuals, on average, 
for 7-8 years, we have over 32,000 mover-year observations.  Conditional on moving more than 100 miles, the mean 
distance of the move is 848 miles and the median is 713 miles.   25
 
that owns equities leads to a 5 percentage point increase in the probability that the mover will 
subsequently enter the equity market.  Importantly, this effect is strongest when we control for 
changes in demographic characteristics, such as income, providing support that the mover effect 
is not being driven off of large changes in income that are concurrent with the move.
20  
 
G.  Refining the Community Ownership Hypothesis – Peer Groups Matter 
Obviously, not all individuals in a 50-mile radius community associate with one another.  
Individuals tend to associate more frequently with other individuals of similar income, age, or 
other characteristics.  As such, if our community ownership variable is really picking up peer 
effects, then we ought to find that people are more influenced by similar individuals than by less 
similar individuals.   
To investigate this, we assign each observation in our sample to one of nine groups based 
on income and age.  We then run a regression that allows us to test for within group and across-
group community effects.  Specifically, we are interested in whether the equity market 
participation rate of “middle income, middle aged” individuals in a community has a larger 
effect on other “middle income, middle aged” individuals in the community than it does on other 
income and age groups in the same community.
21   
Table 10 reports the results.  For 7 of the 9 groups, the “own group” community 
ownership effect is larger than the “cross-group” community ownership effect, and the results are 
statistically significant for 6 of these 7 groupings.  The bottom row of Table 10 reports a 
                                                 
20 In additional results not shown, we confirm that this finding is not being driven solely off of large income changes 
by further limiting the sample to movers for whom the difference between their maximum and minimum income 
over the period implied an annual change of less than 8 percent.  The neighborhood effect is slightly larger and still 
statistically significant.   
21 Duflo and Saez (2003) used a similar identification strategy to identify peer effects in retirement plan 
participation.    26
 
weighted average difference between “own group” effects and “cross group” effects of 6.8 
percentage points.  This suggests that a 20 percentage point increase in equity market 
participation by a particular age/income group in a community will raise the likelihood of equity 
ownership of a household in this group by 1.36 percentage points more than the equity 
ownership likelihood of a household from a different age/income group.  The difference is highly 
significant.  These results are very consistent with our overall interpretation that individuals are 
influenced to participate in the stock market by the actions of their peers.   
 
V. Conclusions 
  This paper is the first to provide evidence regarding the role of two geographic effects 
that influence equity market participation.  The first geographic effect is that individuals are 
influenced by the investment behavior of members of their community.  This is true after 
controlling for a wide range of individual and zip-code-level financial and demographic 
characteristics, using instrumental variables, restricting the sample to self-employed individuals 
and to individuals with no publicly-traded firms in their community, and controlling for 
individual fixed effects.  We also provide evidence that this effect is strongest for the least 
financially sophisticated households.  Finally, we also show that the influence of community 
ownership is strongest within age and income groups. In other words, the equity market 
participation rate of individuals in the same income and age category has a stronger effect on an 
individual’s own stock market participation relative to the participation rate of households 
belonging to other age and income groups.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that “peers 
matter.”     27
 
  The second geographic effect is that proximity to publicly-traded firms also increases 
equity market participation rates.  In particular, the presence of publicly-traded firms within 50 
miles and the share of U.S. market value located within the community are positively correlated 
with equity ownership of individuals.  In contrast to the community ownership effects, the local 
firm effects appear to be stronger among higher income individuals.  This result is consistent 
with a hypothesis that proximity to local firms may provide a pool of potentially profitable 
investments that is easier for more financially sophisticated individuals to discover, which in turn 
influences their decision to own stock.      28
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Table 1 
Correlation Between Actual Equity Ownership and Stock Ownership Proxies, 
Conditional on Filing Tax Return, Using Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1989 – 1998 
 
 
Stock Ownership Proxies  1989 1992 1995 1998  1989  –  1998 
Report  Dividends  0.66 0.65 0.63 0.57  0.62 
Report Capital Gains  0.44  0.46  0.47  0.49  0.47 
Report Dividends and/or 
Capital Gains  0.66 0.63 0.63 0.61  0.63 




Equity Ownership Proxies (in percent), 1987 – 1996 Pooled
a 









Full Sample  22.1% 
1989-98  29.6% 25.6%  17.9% 
By Year        
  1987    25.7  21.9  15.2 
  1988    27.1  23.2  14.7 
  1989  19.0  28.1  24.2  15.8 
  1990    28.0  24.2  15.3 
  1991    28.6  24.7  16.2 
  1992  20.0  30.1  26.1  18.2 
  1993    31.4  27.3  20.4 
  1994    32.5  28.2  21.0 
  1995  21.5  33.2  28.9  21.9 
  1996  26.9  
in 1998  34.4 30.0  23.7 
aNotes: Sample is all individuals that file tax returns. Statistics are weighted by population 
weights.   33
 
Table 3 





 Mean  Percentiles 
 (Std.  Dev.) 10
th   25
th   50
th   75
th   90
th   Maximum
Own Equity?  29.6 
(45.7)         
Equity Ownership within 50 
miles 
29.8 
(7.5)  20.9 25.5 30.1 34.1 38.3  100.0 
Firms within 50 miles?  91.9 
(27.3)         
Share of total U.S. firm  
market value within 50 miles 
 
3.0 
(5.9)  0.000 0.005  0.6  3.2  7.7  27.3 
Population within 50 miles 
(in millions) 
4.0 
(4.6)  0.4 0.8 2.2 5.5  12.9 17.7 
aNotes: Statistics are weighted by population weights. 
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Table 4 
Regression of Stock Ownership (in percent), Focus on Income and Demographic Controls, 
1987 – 1996 
 
Income and Age Controls for Household 
(Income 0 – 50K  and Age < 40 omitted) 
  Race/Ethnicity across Household’s 
Zip Code (White omitted) 
 
     Income negative?  -5.0
***      Black  -3.5
***
     Maximum (0, Income) in $000s  0.0002
***      Indian  -3.1
 
     Maximum (0, Income) squared  -8e-10
***      Asian  -7.8
***
     Income 50 – 150K  8.5
***      Other race  -4.0
 
     Income 150K+  28.1
***      Hispanic  -6.0
***
     Age (in years)  0.65
*** Mean house price in zip ($000s)  -0.002
 
     Age squared  0.0002
  Occupation in Household’s zip  
(Executive / Manager omitted) 
 
     Age 40 – 64  1.2
***      Professional / Specialist  1.6
 
     Age 65+  3.7
***      Technician  11.9
 
Filing Status/Deductions taken by HH 
(Married omitted for Filing Status) 
       Sales  5.5
 
     Claim mortgage  5.8
***      Clerical  -21.6
***
     Single filing status – male  -4.5
***      Private  -32.8
***
     Single filing status – female  -3.9
***      Protective  4.8
 
     Head of Household – male  -9.4
***      Service  7.2
* 
     Head of Household – female  -11.0
***      Farming  4.8
 
     Number of Dependents  -0.27
***      Crafts  -21.4
***
     Self-employed  3.6
***      Operators  -26.8
***
     Schedule E  24.6
***      Transportation / Materials  -43.3
***
     Alternative Minimum Tax  8.1
***      Laborers  12.0
 
     DC Plan  5.0
*** Sector in household’s zip  
(For Profit omitted) 
 
Education across Household’s Zip Code 
(1
st – 8
th Grade Education omitted) 
       Not For Profit  8.8
***
     Start high school  -13.6
***      Local Government  -9.6
** 
     Graduate high school  3.7
       State Government  -21.4
***
     Some college  -4.9
       Federal Government  -21.1
***
     Associate degree  -2.6
       Self-Employed  -1.8
 
     Bachelor degree  18.5
***      Nonpaid  -3.4
 
     Graduate degree  8.2
*  R
2 = 0.416  # of obs. = 753,103
***,  
**, 
* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   35
Table 5 




Dividend income and/or 
capital gains used as proxy   Dividend income used as proxy   Capital gains used as proxy 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4)    (5) (6)    (7)  (8) (9) 












































































Share of total U.S. firm market 





































Equally-weighted average return of 


























Share of firm value within 50 miles 




































Firm employees*1,000 /  







   -0.07
(1.43)











Year dummy variables?  Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes Yes    Yes  Yes Yes 
Demographic controls?  Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes Yes    Yes  Yes Yes 
Zip code controls?  No Yes Yes   No  Yes  Yes    No  Yes Yes 
IV for equity own within 50 miles?  No No Yes   No  No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
R
2
  0.417 0.418 0.418   0.353  0.353 0.353    0.440  0.441 0.441 
Number of observations  753,103 753,103 753,103   753,103  753,103 753,103  753,103  753,103 753,103
aNotes: Instruments for equity ownership of the area within 50-miles of the household include income controls, age controls, deductions taken 
(i.e., mortgage interest and number of dependents), filing status, income/forms filed (self-employed, Schedule E, Alternative Minimum Tax, 
defined contribution plan contributions), education, race/ethnicity, house price, and occupation and sector shares of the people within 50 miles 
of the household.  Zip code controls include income controls, age controls, deductions taken (i.e., mortgage interest and number of 
dependents), income/forms filed (self-employed, Schedule E, Alternative Minimum Tax, defined contribution plan contributions), and filing 
status of the household’s zip code.   
***,  
**, 




Regression of Stock Ownership (in Percent, Report Dividend Income and/or Capital Gains Used as Proxy), 
1987 – 1996 by Year
a 
 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Equity Ownership  





































































Share of total U.S. firm 









































Firm  Controls?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic controls?  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Zip code controls?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.461 0.438 0.432 0.425 0.414 0.411 0.402 0.399 0.393 0.386 
Number  of  observations  84,228 80,969 79,104 77,493 75,702 74,000 72,509 71,119 70,072 67,907 







   37
 
Table 7   
Robustness Checks of Stock Ownership Results to Company Stock Effect 




Self-Employed  NO Publicly-Traded Firm 
within 50 miles 











*   




***   
Adjusted R
2 0.320  0.379 
Number of observations  102,518  47,977 





* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  38
 
Table 8 
Stock Ownership Regressions by Proxies for Financial Sophistication 
(in percent, report dividend income and/or capital gains used as proxy) 
 
 
  Regression by Income Groups (in $000s) 
  0 – 50  50 – 150   150+ 




























2 0.349  0.204  0.086 




Regression by Percent of Individuals in  
Taxpayer’s Zip Code with College Education 
  College < 16.5%  16.5% < College > 33.8% College > 33.8% 




























2 0.383  0.371  0.316 
Number of observations  251,105  251,061  250,937 
Regressions include local firm controls, demographic controls, and zip-code-level demographic controls.  College education is defined 
as having obtained a bachelor or graduate degree. 
***,  
**, 
* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  39
 
Table 9 
Regression of Stock Ownership with Household Fixed Effects, 1987 – 1996 pooled
a 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  Full Sample    Income $0 – 50K 
throughout sample    Income $50 – 150K 
throughout sample    Income $150K+ 
throughout sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 


































     -0.61 
(0.56) 
     0.60
(1.70)
     0.94
(0.79)
 
Share of total U.S. firm market 









    -24.0
(28.7)




Year dummy variables?  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Firm  controls?  No  Yes Yes   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic  controls?  No  No  Yes   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Zip code controls?  No  No  Yes    No Yes    No Yes    No Yes 
R
2  0.759 0.759 0.762   0.766  0.766  0.615  0.618  0.472  0.475 
Number of observations  753,253 753,253 753,103   157,894  157,811    72,076  72,074    168,314 168,301 
aNotes:
 ***,  
**, 
* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  40
 
Table 9: Continued 
Regression of Stock Ownership with Household Fixed Effects, 1987 – 1996 pooled
a 
Panel B: Households that move by at least 100 miles (exclude year of move) 
  Full Sample    Income $0 – 50K 
throughout sample    Income $50 – 150K 
throughout sample    Income $150K+ 
throughout sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 






   6.4
(8.0)




















     -3.09 
(2.81) 
     -2.22
(5.38)
     2.33
(1.86)
 
Share of total U.S. firm market 





     -30.7 
(39.6) 
     58.4
(81.0)
     6.0
(16.9)
 
Year dummy variables?  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Firm  controls?  No  Yes Yes   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Demographic  controls?  No  No  Yes   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Zip code controls?  No  No  Yes    No Yes    No Yes    No Yes 
R
2  0.714 0.714 0.717   0.706  0.711  0.580  0.596  0.412  0.421 
Number of observations  32,301 32,301  32,289   4,646  4,642    2,507  2,507    6,081  6,081 
aNotes:
 ***,  
**, 
* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  41
Table 10 
Importance of Equity Ownership of Households in Same Age-Income Group 
Age-Income Group 
Effect of Average Equity 
Ownership of this Group Upon 
Individuals in THIS Group 
Effect of Average Equity 
Ownership of this Group Upon 
Individuals in OTHER Groups 
Difference 



























































































2 = 0.429  Number of Observations = 680,317 
Regressions also include local firm controls, demographic controls, and zip-code-level demographic controls.   
***,  
**, 
* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
   42
 
 
Figure 1:  Growth in Equity Ownership and Reporting of Dividends 
















Equity Ownership (SCF) Report Dividends &/or Capital Gains
 
Equity ownership estimates are provided by the SCF for 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998.  Equity ownership estimates for years between 
surveys are obtained by a linear interpolation.  43
Appendix Table 1:  Regression of Stock Ownership (in percent), Focus on Income and Demographic Controls, 1987 – 1996 
Income and Age Controls for Household 
(Income 0 – 50K  and Age < 40 omitted) 
       Associate degree  -6.2 
       State Government  -20.0
*** 
     Income negative?  -5.1
***       Bachelor degree  12.6 
***       Federal Government  -18.1
*** 
     Maximum (0, Income) in $000s  0.0002
***       Graduate degree  0.9 
       Self-Employed  0.6
 
     Maximum (0, Income) squared  -7e-10
***  Race/Ethnicity across Household’s
Zip Code (White omitted)  
       Nonpaid  -7.1
 
     Income 50 – 150K  8.1
***       Black / Indian  -2.5 
***  Income and Age Controls for HH’s ZIP CODE
(Income 0 – 50K  and Age <40 omitted)
 
     Income 150K+  27.3
***       Asian  -6.5 
***       Average zip code income negative?  0.8
 
     Age (in years)  0.69
***       Other Race  -0.6 
       Maximum (0, Average Income) in $000s  0.0013
*** 
     Age squared  -0.0002
       Hispanic  -4.9 
***       Maximum (0, Average Income) squared  -2e-08
*** 
     Age 40 – 64  1.5
***  Average House Price in zip ($000s)  0.001 
       Income 50 – 150K (share for zip code)  0.9
*** 
     Age 65+  3.2
***  Occupation in HH’s Zip 
(Executive / Manager omitted)  
       Income 150K+ (share for zip code)  2.9
*** 
Filing Status and Deductions taken by 
Household (Married omitted for Filing Status) 
       Professional / Specialist  9.2 
**       Average Age (for zip code, in years)  -0.17
*** 
     Claim mortgage  5.2
***       Technician  13.4 
*       Average Age (for zip code) squared  0.0017
*** 
     Single filing status – male  -4.5
***       Sales  7.2 
       Age 40 – 64 (share for zip code)  -1.3
*** 
     Single filing status – female  -4.3
***       Clerical  -17.8 
***       Age 65+ (share for zip code)  1.6
** 
     Head of Household filing status – male  -9.5
***       Private  -31.1 
***  Filing Status and Deductions taken for HH’s ZIP 
CODE (Married omitted for Filing Status)
 
     Head of Household filing status – female  -11.1
***       Protective  4.2 
       Claim mortgage (share for zip code)  2.2
*** 
     Number of Dependents  -0.04
       Service  3.9 
       Single filing status – male (share for zip code)  -0.2
 
     Self-employed  3.5
***       Farming  2.5 
       Single filing status – female (share for zip code) 0.8
* 
     Schedule E  24.6
***       Crafts  -19.7 
***       Head of Household filing status – male (zip)  0.9
 
     Alternative Minimum Tax  7.7
***       Operators  -22.5 
***       Head of Household filing status – female (zip)  0.6
 
     DC Plan  4.4
***       Transportation / Materials  -36.5 
***       Number of Dependents (average for zip code)  -1.0
*** 
Education across Household’s Zip Code 
(1
st – 8
th Grade Education omitted) 
       Laborers  7.9 
       Self-employed (share for zip code)  0.4
 
     Start high school  -13.2
***  Sector in HH’s Zip 
(For Profit omitted)  
       Schedule E (share for zip code)  -0.4
 
     Graduate high school  -1.4
       Not For Profit  4.9 
       Alternative Minimum Tax (share for zip code) 
  4.1
*** 
     Some college  -6.5
**       Local Government  -13.0 
***       DC Plan (share for zip code)  2.6
*** 
Coefficients from specification (2) of Table 5 reported.  
***,  
**, 
* Significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  